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KOREMATSU AS THE TRIBUTE THAT VICE
PAYS TO VIRTUE
Jack M. Balkin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mark Killenbeck wants to (partially) rehabilitate the
reputation of one of the Supreme Court’s most despised legal
decisions, Korematsu v. United States.1 He argues that “[w]e
should accept and teach Korematsu as an exemplar of what the
law regarding invidious discrimination on the basis of race,
ethnicity, and national origin should be.”2 In both Korematsu
(and Hirabayashi v. United States)3 the Court asserted that
classifications based on race were subject to strict scrutiny.4 But
“[t]he majority,” Killenbeck explains, “refused to heed their own
mandate. In Hirabayashi they held that the government policy
was ‘reasonable.’ In Korematsu, . . . they failed to actually
utilize” strict scrutiny.5 “In each instance the Justices glossed
over key facts before them, ignored pertinent information, and
were, quite possibly, blinded by their own prejudices and
precedents.”6
But the fact that the Court failed at its institutional duty,
Killenbeck argues, should not detract from the importance of its
doctrinal achievement—the first announcement that courts
should apply strict scrutiny to racial classifications.7 At the same
*
Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment. My thanks to
Sanford Levinson for his comments on a previous draft.
1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2. Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L.
REV. 151, 164 (2021).
3. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
4. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of
a single racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [and] courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny.”); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100 (“Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions
are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”).
5. Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 239.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 189.
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time, he insists, we should be deeply concerned about the quality
of the legal decision making that sits beneath a precedent. That,
he asserts, is the real problem with Korematsu, and he spends
many pages digging into the history to show how bad the
decision-making process really was.
Suppose, Killenbeck asks us to imagine, that we discovered
that the Court’s work in Brown,8 Roe,9 or Grutter,10 rested on
suppressed or fabricated facts, or misconduct by the litigants or
the Justices. Perhaps, he suggests, we might now treat these cases
as “infamous.”11 In Korematsu, Killenbeck argues, “the Court
was led down the primrose path by a record that was both
incomplete and deceptive. Korematsu’s place in the anticanon is
based in significant part on these realities. What other cases might
we add to that roll of infamy if similar misconduct by the
responsible agency or individuals had infected the decisionmaking process?”12
But is Killenbeck correct? Is “Korematsu’s place in the
anticanon . . . based in significant part” on the fact that the
decision-making process in that case was tainted?13 Killenbeck
tries to connect the quality and integrity of advocacy and
decision-making by lawyers and courts—or the lack thereof—to
the honor we currently bestow (or should bestow) on the decisions
they produce. Thus, Korematsu is worthy of our scorn today
because the process of decision was bad. Otherwise, its statement
about strict scrutiny is fine, even laudable.
One is reminded of the old joke: “Other than that Mrs.
Lincoln, how did you like the play?”
Killenbeck seems to be making two different claims.
(1) Even if a case reaches a just result, it should not be
praised if the result was caused by a decision-making process that
was seriously tainted. This is the suggestion he raises about
Brown, Roe, and Grutter.
(2) A case can be praiseworthy even if the decision-making
process was seriously tainted, causing the result to be unjust, if
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
11. Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 228-35.
12. Id. at 235.
13. Id.
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the court states a praiseworthy doctrine. This is his claim about
Korematsu.
Let’s take these claims one at a time.
II. IS THE QUALITY OF THE DECISIONMAKING
PROCESS THE KEY TO OUR PRAISE OR BLAME FOR
PAST SUPREME COURT DECISIONS?
Killenbeck proposes that the decision-making process is, and
should be, very important. Yet results seem to matter—and
matter greatly—to how we think about cases in the past. And not
just the particular result for the individual litigants in the case—
what seems to matter especially is the cultural meaning of a case
in later eras. The fact that John Marshall played fast and loose
with the text of the Constitution and the 1789 Judiciary Act has
not robbed Marbury v. Madison of its canonical status.14 The fact
that the Warren Court purported to base its decision in Brown v.
Board of Education15 on flimsy social science evidence has not
robbed Brown of its luster as one of the crown jewels in the tiara
of American constitutional law.
To be sure, a familiar game in constitutional theory is
attempting to show that anti-canonical cases like Dred Scott v.
Sandford16 and Plessy v. Ferguson17 were badly reasoned
according to the theorist’s favored approach. Conversely, one
tries to defeat opposing theories by showing that they lead directly
to Dred Scott and Plessy.
But bad interpretive theory has little to do with constitutional
renown or infamy. The reason Dred Scott is widely reviled today
is not that it failed to conform to (1) neutral principles of
constitutional law; (2) law as integrity; (3) process protection; (4)
common law constitutionalism; or (5) the fifty-one flavors of
originalism currently in play in the legal academy. No, Dred Scott
is reviled because of its result—that African Americans could
never, ever be citizens of the United States because of their
race—and because of the meaning of the case in the light of
subsequent events, starting with the Civil War and
14.
15.
16.
17.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Reconstruction. Killenbeck wants to argue that the goodness of
the decision-making process is, and should be, central to the
honor and dishonor we bestow on Supreme Court decisions.18 But
to borrow a phrase from Mae West, goodness had nothing to do
with it.19
The canon (and the anticanon) are constructed by cultural
memory, and cultural memory is largely indifferent to, if not
ignorant of, the criteria that Killenbeck is most concerned with.
The central reason why Korematsu is anticanonical today is that
the Court reached a deeply unjust result of which later generations
are ashamed. They are ashamed because twenty-first century
America treats a commitment to racial equality as central to
American values, even if it is a value honored more in the breach
than in the observance. That transformation in values occurred in
part because of World War II, the very context in which
Korematsu was decided. Americans had just successfully
defeated an overtly racist regime in Nazi Germany (which,
ironically, as Jim Whitman explains, had based many of its ideas
on the Jim Crow South).20 In the years that followed, more and
more Americans became embarrassed by the country’s treatment
of African Americans at home, as well as the wartime placement
of Japanese-American citizens in concentration camps.
This helps us answer Killenbeck’s question about what we
would think if we discovered—and fully accepted—that Brown,
Roe, and Grutter were based on shoddy decision-making.21 A lot
depends on whether you think the results in these cases are just
and important—if not foundational to contemporary
constitutional law. Most political liberals think that Brown, Roe,
and Grutter reached results that are not only basically just, but
important constitutional landmarks. For that reason, liberals
would be unlikely to abandon these cases even if we later
discovered that “the Court was led down the primrose path by a
record that was both incomplete and deceptive.”22 Conversely, if
18. See Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 228-35.
19. MAE WEST, GOODNESS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
MAE WEST (1981); see also NIGHT AFTER NIGHT (Paramount Pictures 1932).
20. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 2-5 (2017).
21. See Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 228-35.
22. Id. at 235.
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a case reaches a very unjust result, discovering that it was
produced by a rotten decision-making process just adds to the
obloquy we should heap up on it. That also explains how people
think about Korematsu. What the Court did was bad; the
falsehoods presented to the Court and the faults in the Court’s
decision-making process just make a bad decision worse.
I have just spoken about what political liberals think. But
consider Roe and Grutter from the perspective of political
conservatives deeply opposed to affirmative action or abortion.
Suppose it were proved beyond a doubt that the Justices had
played fast and loose with the facts or deliberately ignored crucial
evidence that completely undermined their arguments, or suppose
that the parties defending abortion rights or affirmative action had
deliberately misled the Justices. I think that opponents of
affirmative action and abortion would be even more convinced
that these cases were terrible blots on the Court’s reputation.
Indeed, even without such proof, Michael Stokes Paulsen has
argued that the decision that reaffirmed Roe, Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,23 is the very worst
decision of all time—worse than Korematsu, worse even than
Dred Scott.24 Showing that the decision-making process in Casey
was defective would simply reinforce that conclusion.
III. WHAT CREDIT SHOULD KOREMATSU RECEIVE
FOR ANNOUNCING THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT
SCRUTINY FOR RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS?
At the end of the day, Killenbeck is not arguing that
Korematsu should be removed from the anticanon—at least not
completely. As we have seen, he argues that we should treat the
Court’s decision-making process as an object lesson in how not
to decide cases. But he wants to bring Korematsu back into the
positive canon in a different way: as the font (along with
Hirabayashi) of the test of strict scrutiny in racial discrimination
cases.

23. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992).
24. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 995, 1001 (2003).
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Why should Korematsu get any credit—much less respect—
as the font of the strict scrutiny doctrine? The United States
Supreme Court is generally loath to overturn its cases, and
normally tries to make lemonade out of its past lemons. Surely
something like that is going on with later citations to Korematsu
and Hirabayashi. But that does not mean that the Korematsu
Court deserves any credit for striking a blow for racial equality.
It’s a bit like saying that if a white person burns a cross on a Black
neighbor’s yard, he should nevertheless get some credit for
simultaneously shouting: “Black Lives Matter!”
Before we begin the discussion, we must deal with a
threshold problem in Killenbeck’s argument. The full name of
the doctrine is strict scrutiny for racial classifications. That is, the
doctrine focuses on whether the state has made an overt or
implicit classification, and not on whether a policy subordinates
one social group to others. It treats classification by the state as
both the central vice of White Supremacy and the chief
mechanism of contemporary racial injustice in the United States.
Needless to say, this is not a very astute diagnosis.
Given its defects, why should we assume that this doctrine
has been an unalloyed good, particularly in the last forty years?
Frankly, it hasn’t been all that good for racial justice in the United
States. By the end of the 1960s, when Loving v. Virginia was
decided,25 states had stopped passing new Jim Crow laws that
overtly classified on the basis of race. Since then, the strict
scrutiny doctrine has been repeatedly used to make legislative
attempts at remedying past societal discrimination
unconstitutional (with the Court citing both Korematsu and
Hirabayashi in justification).26 The doctrine has been employed
to turn Brown v. Board of Education on its head by holding that
25. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
26. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204, 215-16 (1995) (striking
down federal contracting program and citing Korematsu and Hirabayashi in justification);
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989) (striking down state affirmative
action program for construction contracts and explaining that “[t]here are numerous
explanations for th[e] dearth of minority participation [in construction]. . . . Blacks may be
disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction.”); Croson, 488 U.S. at 50001 (citing Korematsu for the proposition that courts should not defer to vague legislative
claims about the continued presence of racial discrimination in society); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that there is no
compelling state interest in remedying past societal discrimination); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273
(citing Hirabayashi).
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voluntary plans to prevent school segregation are unconstitutional
(with the Court citing Hirabayashi).27 Conversely, because the
doctrine focuses on the presence or absence of racial
classification, courts have used the strict scrutiny rule to
legitimate legislative and executive actions that have not
classified on the basis of race, even though they have knowingly
perpetuated racial disadvantages for African Americans.28 In the
Court’s view, the foreseeability—or even the actual knowledge—
that a policy will burden racial minorities (or women) is not
sufficient. One must show that the policy was adopted because it
would harm these groups.29 Absent that showing, the law is
ordinary social and economic regulation.
It deserves a
presumption of legitimacy and constitutionality, and to impugn it
is to disrespect the elected branches of government and attack
democracy itself.30
One might respond that these results have flowed from who
sat on the Supreme Court in the past fifty years, and that another
Court staffed with different personnel would have applied the
doctrine quite differently. Whether or not that is the case, it
reinforces my point. The doctrine of strict scrutiny for racial
classifications is not a moral principle of racial justice and it
should never be confused with one. Rather, it is a doctrinal tool
developed at a particular moment in time that soon proved
27. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731-33
(2007) (plurality opinion) (holding that voluntary desegregation programs are
unconstitutional racial balancing); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 743 (citing Hirabayashi for
the proposition that voluntary attempts at racial integration should be subject to strict
scrutiny, and that any suggestion to the contrary “is fundamentally at odds with our
precedent”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 751-52 (Thomas, J, concurring) (citing
Hirabayashi and explaining that “[t]he Constitution does not permit race-based government
decisionmaking simply because a school district claims a remedial purpose and proceeds in
good faith with arguably pure motives”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 758 n.10 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (citing Korematsu for the proposition that all racial classifications must be
subjected to the “most rigid scrutiny”).
28. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1143, 1146-47 (1997).
29. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
30. See Siegel, supra note 28 at 1137-38 (arguing that the intent standard is premised
on deference to legislative majorities and an unwillingness to impugn their motivations); see
also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976) (arguing for the relatively high bar
of the intent standard because Title VII’s disparate impact analysis “involves a more probing
judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and
executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without
discriminatory purpose, is claimed”).
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unequal to the forces of racial retrenchment that began in the
1970s and have continued to this day. It confuses classification
with equality and constitutionality with justice. In the hands of
courts unsympathetic to the principle of anti-subordination, the
doctrine of strict scrutiny for racial classifications has often
proved to be a tool for preserving racial inequality.31
But suppose we grant that the doctrine of strict scrutiny is,
all other things being equal, something to celebrate. Why should
Korematsu get any kudos for merely saying the words? In
justifying the Nixon Administration’s racial policies, Attorney
General John Mitchell is supposed to have said, “watch what we
do, not what we say.”32 What Korematsu says is that racial
classifications are subject to the “most rigid scrutiny.”33 What it
does is quite another thing.
Suppose the Supreme Court held that torture violated the
Eighth Amendment and then proceeded to uphold torture in a
series of cases. It could do this in any number of ways. It could
(1) redefine torture so that what the government did was
constitutional; (2) create a series of excuses (that is, “compelling
interests narrowly tailored”) for torture; or (3) throw up a series
of procedural obstacles—for example, limitations on judicial
remedies, or invocation of state secrets privileges—so that later
courts would be unable to hold unlawful future acts of torture. If
a court did any of these things, why is its statement that torture
violates the Eighth Amendment particularly worthy of praise
rather than an apology (or a cover-up) for justice denied? Why
does saying one thing and doing the opposite deserve any reward?
Killenbeck’s point seems to be a constitutional version of La
Rochefoucauld’s maxim that “[h]ypocrisy is a tribute vice pays to
virtue.”34 When courts say the virtuous thing, even in an unjust
cause, their statements become part of doctrine, and these
statements can be the basis of future virtuous decision making.
31. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 139, 141 (2011) (arguing that the modern law of equality is also the law of
inequality); Siegel, supra note 28, at 1146-47 (arguing that current equal protection doctrines
help preserve racial inequality).
32. KEVIN L. YUILL, RICHARD NIXON AND THE RISE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE
PURSUIT OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AN ERA OF LIMITS 145 (2006).
33. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
34. See FRANÇOIS, DUC DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS 21 (John Heard trans.,
Dover Publications 2006) (1665), https://perma.cc/WT54-CUSS .
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So we should thank the courts for speaking in the first place. By
paying tribute to constitutional virtue, courts reinforce it, even
when they act hypocritically and unjustly.
But the argument depends on a suppressed premise. Two,
actually. The first is that courts will eventually do the virtuous
thing. The second is that the reason they will do the virtuous thing
is in some way because of the initial hypocritical statement. That
is, hypocrisy at Time One somehow helps produce virtue at Time
Two. But if the causation is lacking, all we have is hypocrisy.
Suppose that after the Court decided Korematsu, it continued
to uphold various forms of racial discrimination in a series of
cases, each time citing the same formula from Korematsu: “all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can.”35 In case after case, the Court decides, for
various reasons, that none of the challenged policies violate the
Constitution. Would we then view Korematsu with pride? No.
We would denounce it as the beginning of an odious program of
hypocrisy, all the more odious because of the Court’s
sanctimonious pronouncements.
What actually happened, of course, is quite different.
Korematsu’s and Hirabayashi’s statements reappear in cases
striking down racially discriminatory laws and practices: first in
Oyama v. California36 in 1948, and then once again in Hernandez
v. Texas37 (decided shortly before Brown), then in Bolling v.
Sharpe,38 then in McLaughlin v. Florida39 in 1964, and then again
in Loving v. Virginia in 1967.40 By that point it appears settled
that racial classifications are presumptively unconstitutional.
Should we conclude from this, however, that Korematsu and
Hirabayashi had some influence on the results in these cases?
Why shouldn’t we rather say that these later cases actually begin
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 n.4 (1954).
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 n.3 (1954).
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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the doctrine of protecting racial equality through the strict
scrutiny test, and that they merely cribbed convenient language
from Korematsu and Hirabayashi to achieve this goal? In these
later decisions, courts were making lemonade from lemons, as
courts often do. Indeed, what one might take away from
Killenbeck’s article is not that we should rehabilitate Korematsu.
It is that we should promote the first of these cases, Oyama v.
California, into the pedagogical canon. Indeed, if we want to
canonize any part of Korematsu, it should be the dissents, not the
majority opinion—as we now do with Holmes and Brandeis’
famous dissents in the early First Amendment cases.
So consider another example. The test of “clear and present
danger” appears first in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 1919
opinion in Schenck v. United States.41 It is an application of an
older approach that asked whether speech had a “bad tendency”
to produce undesirable results.42 Later that year, Holmes came to
the conclusion that the Court’s doctrine was wrong. He began to
dissent in First Amendment cases like Abrams v. United States43
and Gitlow v. New York.44 He continued to employ the language
of clear and present danger from Schenck but turned it into a
libertarian doctrine.
Should we say that the birth of modern First Amendment
jurisprudence is Schenck, because it first uses the words “clear
and present danger,” or Abrams, because it actually uses that
language to protect free speech rights? I would say that the
modern tradition begins with the dissent in Abrams, not the
majority opinion in Schenck, and that Holmes cleverly employed
language from a case about bad tendency to build an intellectual
case for a very different conception of freedom of speech in the
future.45
In the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley argued that
Congress has the power, under Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment, to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery.46
41. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
42. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 248, 285 (1997).
43. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45. See RABBAN, supra note 42, at 7-8 (arguing that Holmes used the phrase “clear
and present danger” in Abrams to reject the bad tendency test and create a new theory of free
speech without having to admit that he had departed from previous precedents).
46. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1883).
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But Bradley interpreted this language very narrowly, holding that
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional.47 The same
language was then taken up, almost a hundred years later, by
Justice Stewart in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,48 to justify
Congress’ power to reach private racial discrimination under the
Thirteenth Amendment.49 Shall we say that the origins of this
doctrine lie in the Civil Rights Cases, which denied Congress the
power, or Jones v. Alfred Mayer, which recognized it?
One could multiply examples, but the central point is this:
Courts engage in all sorts of high-toned language all the time.
They make promises of justice that they have no intention of
keeping. What makes this language valuable is what later courts
actually do with this language. What makes the clear and present
danger test important is not Schenck—it is Holmes’ dissents that
pave the way to cases like Brandenburg v. Ohio.50 What makes
Korematsu’s language about strict scrutiny valuable is not the
decision in Korematsu itself. What makes it valuable is the later
cases—Oyama, Hernandez, Bolling, McLaughlin, and Loving—
that cribbed the language for the opposite purpose—to further
racial equality.
But one might object: surely Korematsu should get some
credit for coining the phrase, even if it was later used for a
contrary purpose. If the phrase had never been coined, later courts
would have been at loss to come up with ways to protect racial
equality. I find this argument unpersuasive. The Court was hardly
lacking in legal materials. The concept of strict scrutiny was
already invented during the Lochner era as a way of protecting
economic liberty, although the phrase itself was not used.51 And
if one wants previous language that would help the Court actually
protect racial equality, one might consider the following, written
sixty years before:

47. Id. at 24-25 (holding that private racial discrimination “has nothing to do with
slavery or involuntary servitude”).
48. 392 U.S. 409, 439-41 (1968).
49. Id. at 441-43.
50. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
51. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE
INVENTION AND LOGIC OF STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 14 (2019); David E. Bernstein, The
Conservative Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 861, 861 (2012).
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[The Fourteenth Amendment] declar[es] that the law in the
States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that
all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal
before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored
race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily
designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them
by law because of their color[.] The words of the amendment
. . . contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity,
or right, most valuable to the colored race,—the right to
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored,—exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.52

A doctrine founded on the language of Strauder v. West
Virginia, which actually did protect racial equality, might be at
least as valuable today as one based on Korematsu’s language of
strict scrutiny. In fact, starting with Strauder might be even
better. Strauder asserts that the law “shall be the same for the
black as for the white,”53 but it also forthrightly acknowledges
that the deeper problem of racial equality is one of social
subordination—the reduction of Blacks “to the condition of a
subject race”54—and that the positions of whites and Blacks are
not always symmetrical. If we want language that furthers justice,
we might look to cases that actually did a bit of justice, and not to
cases where judges merely mouthed the words.
IV. CONCLUSION
The point I take from Killenbeck’s article is a bit different
from the one that he proposes. What a decision means—and
therefore the honor bestowed or withheld from it—is not decided
the day it is handed down. Like any historical artifact, its meaning
is decided later on by what it means to later generations and what
52. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880). Cf. Sanford Levinson,
Why Strauder v. West Virginia Is the Most Important Single Source of Insight on the Tensions
Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS
U.L.J. 603, 614 (2018) (arguing that a close reading of Strauder contains all students need
to know about race and the Fourteenth Amendment).
53. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
54. Id. at 308.
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they use it for. That is especially true in a system of common law
decision-making. Lawyers and judges have multiple ways of
seizing on particular language or characterizing past holdings in
different ways—in order to make earlier cases mean different
things over time. What we make of Korematsu and how we use
it is based in large part on the events that came after it. Its place
in history is shaped by what we, living in that history, want to use
it for.
Nothing stops us from giving credit to Korematsu for first
announcing a doctrine that is useful to us today. But nothing
requires it either. The larger question is this: what should
Korematsu mean to us today, that we find it (partially) worthy of
praise or blame?
Killenbeck has a distinctive answer to this question. He
argues that we should honor good legal process and dishonor bad
legal process, and, moreover, that we should honor doctrinal
phrases useful to us today, no matter the results in the particular
case that spawned them. The lessons he wants to draw from
Korematsu are lessons about the quality of legal decision-making,
and the importance of lawyers and judges adhering to
professional norms in good faith.
These are indeed important lessons, and it is no accident that
Killenbeck draws them at a historical moment in which the rule
of law seems ever more threatened by the day. But the sad fact is
that good legal decision-making, however desirable, is not the
same thing as justice. And, for better and for worse, what we tend
to remember years later about the work of courts—if we
remember it at all—is not judges’ professional skill, their
attention to the factual record of cases, their scrupulousness about
procedural niceties, and their devotion to craft. Rather, it is
whether, in the eyes of later generations, they did justice in their
time.

